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The Rise of Electoral Salafism in Egypt and Tunisia: The Use of Democracy as a Master 
Frame 
 
 
Emmanuel Karagiannis1 
Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London 
 
 
Following the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions, Salafi parties have been established 
in Egypt and Tunisia. They tend to have ultra-conservative views on social and gender 
issues, but have denounced the use of violence. The al-Nour party in Egypt and the Reform 
Front in Tunisia have advocated the implementation of Sharia by democratic means. They 
have chosen to campaign through the parliament and within the constitution. However, 
their participation in the political system of post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia is a 
puzzle given Salafism’s rejection of democracy. The article will utilize framing theory to 
understand why electoral Salafis have endorsed democratic practices to gain support and 
survive politically. It will first explain the content of the democracy master frame. Then the 
article will describe the political transformation of Salafism in Egypt and Tunisia. Finally, 
it will analyse how Salafis have adopted the democracy master frame to achieve their 
political goals. 
 
Salafism, Egypt, Tunisia, democracy, elections, Al-Nour 
 
Introduction 
The Salafi movement has long been identified with extremism and violence. Yet, it is far 
from being homogeneous. It is a large and acephalous movement with many different variations 
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that has spread across the Muslim world (Cavatorta 2015; Meijer 2009). It has been claimed that 
there are three subgroups of Salafis: the purists, the jihadis, and the politicos (Wiktorowicz 2007, 
207). Each one has its own strategy and agenda, although the common goal is to live under Sharia. 
Many Salafis have engaged only in da‘wa (call to Islam) and education activities, while attempting 
to purify Islam from its non-Islamic elements; other Salafis have engaged in jihadi activities 
against foreign powers or fellow Muslims; and some others believe that the Salafi movement can 
play role in the political life of a country.   
Salafi parties have been established in post-Arab Spring Egypt and Tunisia participating in  
elections. Yet, most Salafis have typically rejected democracy as a man-made system that goes 
against the tenets of the Muslim faith. From their point of view, Sharia is a God-given code of laws 
that human beings must always follow. Democracy is immoral because man does not abide by 
God’s rules and becomes ignorant of his duties. Indeed, several Salafi scholars have openly 
condemned democracy and elections. For instance, Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, one of the 
most important Salafi scholars, argued that ‘elections according to democracy are unlawful, and 
parliaments that do not govern in accordance with the Quran and the Sunnah, but rather on the 
basis of the majority’s arbitrariness, are tyrannical’ (Rabil 2014, 37). 
However, the article will claim that some Salafis now see elections as a method to advance 
their faith-based agenda which aims at the establishment of a Sharia-ruled society. For this 
purpose, they have utilized the master frame of democracy. More specifically, they have framed 
their political struggle as part of the democratization process following the Arab Spring 
revolutions. The article will first describe the master frame of democracy. Then it will examine the 
rise of al-Nour party in Egypt. Also, it will describe the emergence of electoral Salafis in 
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neighbouring Tunisia. Finally, it will analyse how electoral Salafis have applied the democracy 
master frame to their local political environments.  
 
The master frame of democracy 
The Muslim world has experimented with democracy for more than one hundred years. 
The Ottoman Empire initiated some democratic reforms in the last quarter of the 19th century. The 
constitution of 1876 established a system of constitutional monarchy that lasted only two years 
before the restoration of absolute monarchy by Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Following the Young Turk 
Revolution in 1908, the Sultan was forced to restore the 1876 constitution and re-establish the 
Ottoman parliament (Rogan 2015, 2). The Muslim world went through a second phase of 
democratization after the end of Second World War. Syria became an independent republic in 
1946 and had its first parliamentary elections one year later; Turkey held its first legislative 
elections in 1950; Indonesia’s first parliamentary elections took place in 1955 alongside 
neighbouring Malaysia. Despite the organization of elections, democracy failed to develop strong 
roots in the Muslim world which suffered from authoritarianism and repression.  
Since the early 2000s, more and more Islamist groups and parties have joined the 
democratic process. It is the third phase of the Muslim world’s democratization conducted not by 
governments but non-state actors. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood first participated in 
parliamentary elections in 2000. The Palestinian group Hamas participated in the 2005 municipal 
elections and the 2006 legislative elections. Graham E. Fuller supports the view that ‘the majority 
of Islamist movements have long since reached the conclusion that democratization is the best 
overall vehicle by which to present their agenda to the public and to gain political influence and 
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thereby eventually to come to power’ (Fuller 2003, 29). With the outbreak of the Arab Spring 
revolutions, this political trend has only been accelerating.  
There is a long debate about the compatibility of Islam with democracy. It has been argued 
that Shura (collective consultation) is the Islamic equivalent of democracy. There are two verses 
in the Quran referring to consultation: ‘And those who respond to their Lord and keep up prayer, 
and whose affairs are [decided] by counsel among themselves’ (42:38) and ‘So pardon them and 
ask protection for them, and consult them in (important) matters’ (3: 158). Many Islamic thinkers 
have elaborated on the relationship between Islam and democracy. For example, Fethullah Gülen 
has argued that ‘Islam recommends a government based on a social contract. During the rule of 
the first four caliphs (632 AD-661 AD) in particular, the fundamental principles of government 
mentioned above—including free elections—were fully observed’ (Gülen 2001).  
Democracy is not only a popular political system, but also a powerful master frame.  
Framing theory has explored how social movements construct and disseminate messages to 
mobilize supporters. According to Erving Goffman, frame is an interpretive schema through which 
information is encountered and processed (Goffman 1974). In effect, it constitutes a form of 
discourse that draws on shared meanings (Hunt et al 1994). A master frame is a set of meanings 
that enjoys even broader popular resonance (Snow and Benford 1992). According to Pamela Oliver 
and Hank Johnston, ‘movement participants draw upon master frames to portray their perceived 
injustice in ways that fit the tenor of the times and thus parallels other movements’ (Oliver and 
Johnston 2005, 189). Therefore, master frames tend to be as generic as possible because only then 
they can be used by many aggrieved groups (Carroll and Ratner 1996, 602-603). Social movements 
would adopt those master frames that resonate with the culture and situation of potential 
sympathizers. They are usually transmitted through the media, conversations, speeches, slogans, 
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and visual representations (e.g. photos) (Johnson 2002, 66). Therefore, the concept of master frame 
places more emphasis on strategies rather than value orientations of social movements (Turner 
1994, 79). 
The master frame of democracy has been utilized by many groups and parties all around 
the world. According to Thomas Olesen, the dominance of the democracy master frame is 
connected to the end of the Cold War (Olesen 2005, 56). In particular, the anti-communist 
revolutions of 1989 in East Europe appropriated the democracy master frame that had been first 
advanced by the Solidarity movement in Poland (McAdam 1996, 49). During the mid-1990s, the 
revolutionary movement of Zapatistas managed to frame its uprising for the rights of the 
indigenous population in the Mexican province of Chiapas as part of a global drive for 
democratization (Mann 2015, 115). The master frame of democracy was used by disability groups 
during protests in Egypt in 2010 and 2011 to promote equality among citizens (Barnartt 2014, 67-
78). Due to its widespread application, it is subject to localized interpretations. In other words, it 
has a high degree of flexibility and variability in accordance to particular political and cultural 
conditions. 
The democracy master frame consists of three main components. First, it includes the 
principle of political equality which can be summarized as ‘one person one vote’. In a proper 
democratic system, the whole adult population can participate in free, fair and periodic elections. 
This is a sensitive issue for some Muslim-majority countries, where the right of women to vote 
and run for public office either is not fully recognized (e.g. Saudi Arabia) or is disputed (e.g. post-
Taliban Afghanistan). The acquisition of citizenship is often the prerequisite for equal political 
rights. Actually, there are many regimes that refuse citizenship to politically marginalized groups, 
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such as members of ethnic minorities and foreign-born long-term residents (e.g. Rohingya 
Muslims in Burma).  
Second, the master frame contains the concept of majority rule whereby the decision-
making is carried out by those who received most votes. Without majority rule, democracy ceases 
to exist because a minority would dictate its will on the rest of society. This has been a particularly 
attractive component for post-war self-determination movements that represented large ethnic 
groups against colonial powers (e.g. Algeria 1960s). The logic of this component is straight-
forward: the numerical strength of a majority can delegitimize any effort to establish a minority 
rule.  
Third, the master frame offers the value of political legitimacy that gives a normative 
advantage to those who claim to have the consent of the people. No modern political leader can 
afford to ignore the will of the majority. Thus, parties and movements that accept democracy, 
which privileges the many rather than the few, can gain more political legitimacy than anti-system  
movements (e.g. the radical Left). This is why even authoritarian regimes have organized elections 
and referendums to demonstrate, domestically and internationally, their ‘democratic nature’. In 
Egypt, for example, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi won the 2014 presidential election with 96.1 
percent of the vote (Kingsley 2014). 
Salafis have been increasingly keen to employ the democracy master frame locally to 
mobilize people and support their particularistic cause. With the help of this master frame, they 
can gain enough political legitimacy to seek policy changes. But participation in elections does not 
always mean full acceptance of liberal values and norms. Salafis have often modified the idea of 
democracy to fit the local political and cultural context.  
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The reluctant democratization of Egyptian Salafism 
Salafism appeared in Egypt in the 1970s. The first Salafis organized themselves into groups 
to purify Islam from non-Islamic elements and propagate a literal interpretation of the Quran and 
the Sunnah. During the 1980s and 1990s, some of them came under the influence of al-Albani and 
other Salafi scholars who returned from Saudi Arabia (Gauvain 2013, 34). For three decades, 
Salafis refused to be involved in Egyptian politics because they viewed democracy as a man-made 
system that goes against the will of God and wanted to avoid any confrontation with the Mubarak 
regime.1 
The Salafi scene of Egypt has been dominated by Alexandria-based al- Da‘wa al-Salafiyya 
(The Salafi Call). Al-Da’wa has focused on charity activities for years. It has established a large 
network of clinics, orphanages and welfare projects to aid the poor and needy. Salafi leaders have 
denied that they have received money from Gulf countries to finance their social programs, but 
they have revealed little information about the source of their funding (McTighe 2014). The 
Mubarak regime sought to use them as a counterbalance against the Muslim Brotherhood. 
However, the Egyptian authorities from time to time banned their publications and arrested Salafi 
leaders.  
Al-Daw’a did not participate in the January 25, 2011 Revolution against Mubarak. One of 
the founding leaders of the movement, Yasser al-Burhami, specified that it was not prohibited for 
Muslims to participate in the protests against the Egyptian regime, but he advised them to avoid it 
(AhramOnline 2011). The cautious stance adopted by Salafis can be explained as an act of political 
survival; in the words of another Salafi leader, ‘they would have bombed us from the air if they 
saw our beards in Tahrir’ (Ashour 2012). Hence Egypt’s Salafi movement did not join the uprising 
against the Egyptian regime, apart from individual members.  
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Despite their self-restraint, Salafis decided to join the post-Mubarak political system. The 
Party of Light (Hizb al-Nour – hereafter al-Nour) was established by the al-Da’wa movement after 
the Egyptian revolution in January 2011. On 2 November 2011, the Salafi-oriented Alliance for 
Egypt was formed by three parties: Al-Nour, Hizb al-Asala (The Authenticity Party), and Hizb el-
Benna Wa El- Tanmia (The Building and Development Party – hereafter BDP). Hizb al-Asala was 
formed by Muhammad Abd al-Maqsud, a Salafi preacher from Cairo. The BDP was established 
by the former jihadi group Jammat al Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) which launched a campaign 
of terror against the Egyptian state during the 1990s. Yet, its leaders renounced violence and 
established the BDR with the slogan ‘construction, development, Sharia, political freedom, and 
social justice’ (Yildirin 2014, 17).  
Yasser al-Burhami justified the participation of al-Nour in the parliamentary elections of 
2011-2012 by arguing that ‘Islam must become involved in all aspects of life, even the political, 
and the Islamic movement must unite’ (AhramOnline 2011). Farhad Khosrokhavar has argued that 
the participation of the Egyptian Salafis in the post-Mubarak political system signified a 
fundamental change in their strategy. By abandoning their non-political stance and forming a 
political party, Salafis recognized implicitly the democratic process (Khosrokhavar 2012, 114). 
But other scholars have viewed this shift as a tactical rather than strategic decision. According to 
Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, ‘their transformation stems more from political expediency 
than a natural ideological evolution. As a result, their commitment to the democratic process is 
tenuous’ (Bokhari and Senzai 2013, 93). Whatever the case may be, the decision to participate in 
elections is of great significance because it creates a political precedent for the future of Salafism.  
In the 2011-2012 parliamentary election, the Alliance for Egypt came second in votes 
receiving 27.8 percent of the total. As a result, al-Nour won 111 of the 498 parliamentary seats 
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contested; the Authenticity Party won 3 seats, and the BDP 13 seats (Al Jazeera 2012). In the 
presidential election of 2012, the Salafi candidate Hazem Salah Abu Ismail was disqualified by 
the electoral authorities. Consequently, the party supported the moderate Islamist Abdel Moneim 
Aboul Fotouh in the first round and Mohamed Morsi in the second one.  
Al-Nour has shifted towards addressing social and economic challenges without 
abandoning its Salafi character. Its electoral program of 2011 revealed a state-centric approach 
whereby the government is asked to provide most services to Egyptian citizens. Also, the party 
favoured a planned economy with full employment provided by the state. Besides, al-Nour was 
preoccupied with public health and piety; it advocated the banning of smoking and alcohol (Al-
Nour Party 2011, 16). The party included environmental issues in its program, claiming that the 
‘absence of religious faith has allowed officials and citizens alike to pollute the environment’ (Al-
Nour Party, 2011, 16).  
Politically speaking, al-Nour has become increasingly pragmatic and flexible (Lacriox 
2016). In the early post-Mubarak period, the party stressed its commitment to the implementation 
of Sharia as the law of the land. The competitive nature of Egyptian politics has forced them to 
change views; for example, former chairman Abd al-Ghaffour stated that al-Nour ‘rejects the idea 
of a religious state. It is unacceptable’ (Cesari 2014, 142). Moreover, the party chairman invited 
Copts to join al-Nour since they are fellow Egyptians. Ghafour even served as assistant-president 
of integration in the Morsi government.  
While in parliament, al-Nour has been open to collaboration with other political forces. 
Following the December 2012 constitutional referendum which strengthened the Morsi 
government, al-Nour worked together with the secularist National Salvation Front against the 
Brotherhood (Ashwal 2013, 6). Even more surprisingly, al-Nour joined socialist parties in 
10 
 
opposing loans from the International Monetary Fund because Sharia forbids the payment of 
interest for loans (Ashwal 2013, 6). 
Notwithstanding their political pragmatism, Salafis’ relationship with the Muslim 
Brotherhood is at best ambivalent. There are historical roots to the tensions between them. 
Actually, al-Da’wa was established in Alexandria in the 1970s by students who opposed the 
Ikhwan in the local university. The Egyptian authorities tolerated its existence for many years 
because the movement did not seek political change. In contrast, the Ikhwan was heavily repressed 
by the regime because it was accused of conspiring against the state. Yet, many Salafis have 
criticized the Ikhwan for being too secretive and prioritizing party interests over Islamic principles. 
In fact, they do not consider the Brotherhood an Islamic organization. Al-Nour has taken a more 
conservative view than the Brotherhood on social issues; for example, they support strict gender 
segregation. 
During the 2012-2013 protests against the Morsi government, al-Burhami and other senior 
Salafi leaders called for the resignation of the Egyptian president (Youm 2013). More importantly, 
to the astonishment of many of its members, al-Nour supported General Sisi’s coup against the 
Morsi government. It was a politically risky decision because many supporters of the party sided 
with the Ikhwan and denounced the military coup. Yet, the Salafi leadership did not remain united 
in this act of political manoeuvring. Sheikh Ahmed Aboul Enein, a senior official, resigned from 
the party (Kingsley 2013). The decision of al-Nour to support the military coup against a 
democratically-elected president can be explained by two factors. First the party had faced harsh 
competition from the Ikhwan and grasped the opportunity to remain the only Islamist force in the 
country’s political system. Second, the coup was supported by the Saudi government which is al-
Nour’s main external sponsor. At that time, the Kingdom was competing with Qatar for the hearts 
11 
 
and minds of Egyptian Muslims. Therefore, Riyadh backed Salafis and Doha supported the Ikhwan 
(Foreign Policy 2014).  
In the 2015 parliamentary elections, al-Nour won only 11 seats. Three reasons can explain 
its poor performance. To start with, the Sisi regime reduced the number of party-list seats (only 
120 out of 596) and increased the number of independent candidates (448 of 596). Moreover, 28 
MPs were selected directly by President Sisi. Additionally, the overall voter turnout was very low 
and those casting their vote largely supported pro-regime candidates. The Salafi supporters 
‘punished’ al-Nour for its ambiguous stance vis-à-vis the Egyptian military. Finally, the party itself 
decided to keep a low profile during the elections to avoid antagonizing the Sisi regime. During 
2014, al-Nour had faced lawsuits seeking its dissolution because the Egyptian constitution states 
that it is ‘not permissible to establish any political party on a religious basis’ (Auf 2014). 
Al-Nour has tried hard to survive politically in the post-coup political order in Egypt. 
Hence it has declared itself not a religious party, but as a party that is based on religion. In this 
way, its leaders have hoped to avoid the constitutional prohibition on religious parties. They have 
argued that the party is ‘consistent with the rules of the constitution and political parties’ law’ 
(Bayoumi 2014). Also, the party seeks to guarantee fundamental rights within the framework of 
Sharia, including rule of law, freedom of speech, and freedom of association (Jung 2012, 3). While 
not abandoning the goal of adopting Sharia as the law of the land, al-Nour has campaigned for 
democracy and civil liberties. Thus, it can present itself as part of the pro-democracy movement 
in Egypt.  
 In any case, the participation of Salafis in the Egyptian political system constitutes an 
important departure from their previous isolationist stance. They constitute a relatively 
12 
 
inexperienced political movement which tries to strike a balance between the dominance of the 
military and the popularity of the Ikhwan.  
 
The emergence of Tunisia’s electoral Salafism 
Salafism appeared in Tunisia sometime in the 1990s, but it did not attract a massive 
following. It remained a clandestine movement with little influence in the Tunisian society. The 
first generation of Tunisian Salafis avoided any involvement in politics and concentrated on 
personal morality and piety. Nevertheless, Salafis were heavily repressed by the Ben Ali regime 
that espoused a strict secularism. The revolution of 2011 and the subsequent rise of al-Nahda 
changed the political realities for Tunisian Salafis. 
The Salafi-oriented Reform Front (Jabhat al-Islah) was established by Mohamed 
Khouja after the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime in January 2011. It has been viewed as 
the successor of the secretive group Islamic Front which operated during the 1980s. 
Although its candidates ran as independents in the October 2011 parliamentary elections, the party 
failed to win any seats. The party was legalized in late March 2012 under the al-Nahda-led 
government. During 2011, the interim government had twice refused to recognize the 
Reform Front as a legitimate party due to national security concerns  (Zelin 2012). 
Therefore, Jabhat al-Islah has tried hard to portray itself as party that endorses pluralism. 
Indeed, its electoral platform stated that ‘the door is open to all Tunisians who believe in the 
[Islamic] principles, without exclusion or marginalization’ (Reform Front Party 2012).  
Moreover, the Reform Front has attempted to promote a new political vision for 
post-Arab Spring Tunisia. While it represents the community of Salafis, the party 
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advocates a more democratic political system with checks and balances. Therefore, it has 
committed to:  
 
The establishment of a pluralistic political climate...[to ensure the] transfer of 
power by appealing to the polls without exclusion or marginalization of any class 
of the society....[while] establishing the principle of the separation of the three 
powers and strengthening the independence of the judiciary within the limits of the 
provisions of Sharia (Reform Front Party 2012). 
 
It appears that the Reform Front has not only accepted the basic tenets of democracy, but has also 
used them to maintain its position in the post-revolution political system. Yet, the party has not 
distanced itself from its Salafi roots. Hence it aims at ‘restoring the Islamic way of life to establish 
an Islamic state that implements Islam and Sharia’ (Reform Front Party 2012). In this way, the 
target audience is the community of devout Muslims who want the implementation of Sharia.  
Apart from the Reform Front, there are two more Salafi parties: Hizb al-Asala (The 
Authenticity Party) and Hizb al-Rahmah (The Mercy Party) (Marks 2013, 109). The former is 
headed by Ali al-Mujahed who used to live in France, while the latter is led by Imam Said al-
Jazeeri who spent time in Canada. Their appeal is very limited, drawing support from poor 
neighbourhoods of Tunis and other Tunisian cities. In fact, none of them managed to win any seats 
in the October 2014 parliamentary elections.  
But even clandestine Salafi groups have not completely rejected democracy. The 
more confrontational group Partisans of Sharia (Ansar al-Sharia) was established in April 
2011 by Saif Allah Bin Hussein, a veteran of the war against the Red Army in 
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Afghanistan. As opposed to militant Salafis in other parts of the Arab world, Ansar al-Sharia 
does not reject the electoral process. In the words of a senior member, the group is not ‘absolutely 
in opposition to pluralism and elections....The main point is that we could conceive of such a 
development, but only in the context of an Islamic state…Within this framework, the existence of 
parties and elections would not be forbidden’ (Merone 2013). In effect, the group has attempted to 
blend its version of Islamism with some democratic practices.  
This innovative approach largely derives from the reality of modern Tunisia which is the 
most Westernized society in the Arab world, apart from Lebanon. There is a large middle class 
that maintains strong links with France and other European countries (Honwana 2013, 8). It is 
politically risky for the Salafis to reject totally the electoral process in the post-revolutionary 
Tunisia where citizens’ empowerment has become a defining element of the new political system. 
For example, Ansar al-Sharia has come to recognize that ‘Tunisia is a specific country and 
this specificity should be respected…We have the Quran and the Sunnah, sure, which are 
universal. But we also have our own specific context. We are neither Afghanistan, nor Iraq’ 
(Merone 2013).  
Yet, Ansar al-Sharia represents the most extreme version of Tunisian Salafism with links 
to the international Jihadi-Salafi movement. Members of Ansar al-Sharia allegedly assassinated 
two left-wing politicians, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi in February and June 2013 
respectively (Ryan 2013). The group has also accused al-Nahda and the Reform Front of having 
links to the U.S. security services (The Economist 2014). Consequently, Tunisian authorities 
decided to designate the group as a terrorist organization in August 2013 (BBC News 2013). 
Nevertheless, Salafi groups have often set the political agenda in Tunisia. When a dispute 
broke out in the University of Manouba over whether female students can wear the niqab in the 
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classrooms, Said Ferjani, the spokesman of al-Nahda, stated that the university must find a solution 
‘without infringing in any shape or form on a woman’s fundamental right to choose her own 
clothing’ (Marks 2012, 23). At first sight, al-Nahda has followed a middle path between the Salafi 
conservatism and secularism. In reality, however, al-Nahda has maintained an ambiguous 
approach towards Salafi parties. It tried to build a tactical alliance with Salafis even before their 
parties were recognized as legal. During the October 2011 parliamentary elections, the Reform 
Front asked its supporters to vote for al-Nahda in those constituencies that there were no Salafi 
candidates (Zelin 2012). Moreover, hard-line figures within al-Nahda have maintained links with 
Salafi groups; for example, Sadok Chourou participated in Ansar al-Sharia’s Congress in May 
2011 (Lefevre 2012, 926).  
Nonetheless, the then leader of the Reform Front Mohamed Khouja accused al-Nahda of 
being too eager to compromise with its secular coalition partners (Hamid 2014, 201). Indeed, it 
seems that Salafis have increasingly competed against the moderate al-Nahda for the votes of the 
pious Muslims. According to Anne Wolf, there are three reasons for the defection of supporters 
from al-Nahda to Salafi groups: first, al-Nahda did not support a reference to Sharia in the new 
Tunisian constitution; second, it has not taken action against members of the Ben Ali kleptocratic 
regime; and finally, it did not support socio-economic reforms to improve the lives of people (Wolf 
2013). 
Their limited electoral appeal means that Salafis are still a marginal force in Tunisian 
politics. However, they have evolved into a movement that can utilise democracy as a master 
frame. In this way, electoral Salafis can gain legitimacy and support from pious Tunisians who 
participate in the democratic process.   
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Utilising the democracy master frame 
The rise of electoral Salafism in North Africa is not a unique development. The first Salafi 
parties were actually established in the Gulf region. In Kuwait, the Islamic Salafi Alliance (al-
Tajammu al-Islami al-Salafi) entered the national politics in the 1990s. Salafis managed to get 
elected as members of Kuwait’s National Assembly in December 2012, July 2013 and November 
2016. One of them, Ali Saleh al-Umair was moved to the position of minister for oil in a cabinet 
reshuffle in January 2014 (Katzman 2014, 8). In neighbouring Bahrain, the Islamic Purity Party 
(al-Asalah al-Islamiyah) was founded in 2002 and won two seats in the 2014 parliamentary 
elections. The participation of Salafi parties in elections in Kuwait and Bahrain can be explained 
by three factors. First, there is a small (but not insignificant) local Salafi community which means 
that such parties have an electoral base and enjoy some degree of legitimacy. Second, Salafis have 
allied with the Sunni monarchies to oppose local Shia political forces in the two countries. Third, 
Salafi parties have received significant support from Saudi Arabia (Westall 2012; Marhoon 2013). 
To sum up, the emergence of electoral Salafism in the Gulf is mainly connected to the politics of 
Sunni-Shia antagonism.   
In contrast to the Gulf region, the emergence of electoral Salafism in North Africa is the 
result of cataclysmic political changes. The outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions has led to a 
wave of democratization across the region. As a result, tens of political parties have been 
established to participate in the post-revolution political systems. The new Salafi parties in Egypt 
and Tunisia have chosen to campaign through the parliament and within the constitution. These 
parties have ultra conservative views on social and gender issues, but they have denounced the use 
of violence. It is a new generation of Salafis seeking the mainstreaming of Salafism via the 
electoral process. 
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Nevertheless, there are some important differences in the political priorities of Tunisian 
and Egyptian Salafis. The former have focused more than the latter on cultural/language issues 
because French still enjoys an important status in Tunisia as a widely spoken language (Hammond 
2011). As a result, Tunisian Salafis have advocated the Arabization of the education system and 
social life. In contrast, their Egyptian counterparts have not discussed language issues because they 
live in a society where Arabic is the main instrument of communication. Instead, they are 
concerned with the role of Christians in Egyptian politics because there is a large minority of Copts 
(Awad 2014). Again, local circumstances dictate priorities and set the parameters of Salafis’ 
actions. 
Irrespective of their differences, both Egyptian and Tunisian Salafis have strived to 
‘Salafize’ the masses by demonstrating flexibility towards democracy. Their isolationist position 
was overcome by the speed of political events in Egypt and Tunisia. Consequently, Salafis decided 
to participate in the electoral process because they came to recognize the new political reality. 
They have seen a political opportunity for themselves to promote their agenda and later even gain 
power.  
Consequently, electoral Salafis have developed a more consensual approach to society and 
politics. For instance, the Reform Front has urged the society to ‘take advantage of the 
achievements of the Western civilization and to work on...the indigenization of them’ (Reform 
Front Party 2012). From its point of view, Muslims could learn from the West and adopt some 
good things. Moreover, the Reform Front has presented a pro-democracy platform. Hence 
its leader Muhammed Khouja stated that ‘it is no longer the time for armed jihad…we 
believe Islam is a religion of democracy and freedom’ (Zelin 2012). Nevertheless, his 
understanding of democracy is quite unique. In his words, ‘in Europe, democracy gives 
18 
 
sovereignty to the people, but in Muslim countries, we prefer to emphasize the sovereignty of 
Islamic legislation…the job of the lawmaker is to distinguish the haram (illicit) from what is halal 
(licit) according to Islamic law’ (Wolf 2012). His version of democracy is tailored for religious 
Tunisians who wish to support electoral Salafism. 
Likewise, Egyptian Salafis have attempted to strike a balance between the tenets of global 
Salafism and the local political realities. Al-Nour and other Salafi parties have called for Sharia to 
be the sole source of legislation in post-Mubarak Egypt. Hence Salafis strongly supported the 2012 
constitution, prepared by the Brotherhood-controlled Constituent Assembly, because its article 219 
stated that legislation will be based on Sharia as prescribed by Sunni Islam. Following the coup 
against Morsi in June 2013, the 2012 constitution was suspended by the Egyptian military. 
Although al-Nour joined a committee which had the aim to prepare a new constitution, it failed to 
prevent the removal of article 219; yet, it decided to support the 2013 draft constitution because 
al-Azhar University, the oldest Sunni academic institution in the Muslim World, ruled in favour 
of abolishing this article (Rose and Ashraf 2013). The Supreme Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation of Sharia will serve as the principal source of legislation. The prevailing political 
circumstances forced Egyptian Salafis to change position in a way that reflects their growing 
capacity to compromise. 
In this context of political transition, Salafis have utilized democracy as a master frame to 
mobilize support and increase their appeal among Muslim communities. The adoption of the 
democracy master frame is a necessary step for the political survival of those Salafis who have 
decided to follow a non-violent approach and take advantage of the post-revolutionary momentum. 
This development puts electoral Salafis on a collision course with those who still condemn 
democracy as man-made system that goes against Sharia. 
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At first sight, it appears that Salafi parties have been reluctant to accept the principle of 
political equality because it implies female participation in politics. Like most Islamists, they have 
advocated traditional roles for women. Yet, Tunisian and Egyptian Salafis have recognized 
implicitly the existence of this component. Al-Nour was obliged to include female candidates on 
the party lists for the 2011 parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, party leaders stressed that they 
support gender segregation and women to remain at the bottom of the lists to minimize their 
chances to get elected (Jadaliyya 2011). Moreover, al-Nour selected female candidates based on 
their ‘good reputation’ and commitment to wear the niqab (Al Arabiya News 2014). Since then, 
al-Nour has shifted toward a more inclusive approach. In April 2015, the party announced that its 
electoral list would include 120 female candidates, including Christians and niqab-wearing women 
(AhramOnline 2015). However, Salafis would accept neither a Christian nor a female as a head of 
state. The Salafi rationale was provided by Mohamed Mokhtar al-Mady, a senior official of al-
Nour: a Christian president would not know how to apply Sharia, while a woman can ‘go weak 
when [she] gets her period’ (Dabash 2011). 
In Tunisia, Salafis have faced similar dilemmas because their anti-women bias is not well-
received by the society. Due to the electoral laws, the Reform Front was forced to include female 
candidates in its lists during the October 2014 parliamentary elections. Some of these women have 
been vocal about their rights and role in Tunisian politics.  For instance, a female candidate stated 
‘I want to represent all Tunisian women. I took my own decision to participate in these elections. 
Nobody added my name to gain votes for veiled women’ (Ouefelli 2014). While women do not 
play a leadership role in the movement, it seems that there is a Salafi variation of feminism in the 
making. 
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Although global Salafism has propagated a conservative and traditional view on women’s 
rights, local followers have preferred to meet legal requirements and acknowledge societal 
realities. Consequently, the participation of female Salafi candidates in elections broke a long-
standing taboo and set a precedent for Salafis to accept the political equality of the female 
population. The adoption of democracy master frame entails an obligation to accept the component 
of political equality, which undermines Salafi beliefs about gender relations. 
Despite being a political minority, Salafis have endorsed the component of majority rule. 
Since they are trapped in their own reality, many Salafis tend to overestimate their potential 
influence in their respective societies. During an interview on February 9, 2014, al-Burhami 
claimed that the ‘al-Nour party’s support base is expanding every day’ (El-Mahdy 2014). This 
misinterpretation of political reality can be easily explained. First, long isolation and clandestine 
experiences have contributed greatly to the loss of political perspicacity. Second, Salafis strongly 
believe in the eventuality of their success so the majority will eventually follow them. 
In any case, democracy is not understood by electoral Salafis only as an expression of 
people’s will to choose their leaders. It is an opportunity for a soul-searching exercise that could 
lead to authentic Islam. Thus, the Salafi democracy does not guarantee gender equality or equality 
among religious groups. In fact, it is centred on an Islamist equivalent of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
‘general will’ that suppresses individualism and encourages conformity (Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
1968, 61-65). This belief derives from the rejection of majoritarianism because the Quran and the 
Sunnah suggest that the view of the majority is not always right (Anjum 2016, 468). 
This component can also explain the political strategy of some Egyptian Salafis in the post-
Mubarak political system. Al-Nour first allied itself to the Muslim Brothers and then to the all-
powerful military. In both cases, the party used this component to justify its strategy of shifting 
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alliance. In 2012, the decision to support Morsi in the second round of the presidential elections 
was presented as the only option for Egyptian Salafis; the second candidate, Ahmed Shafik, was a 
former senior officer of the Air Force and a former minister under Hosni Mubarak. Despite their 
long history of competition and mutual suspicion, Salafis and Muslim Brothers supported each 
other against members of the previous regime to form a new majority. But when the new president 
became partisan and protests erupted against him, Salafis utilized the same master frame to defend 
their alliance with their former foes. An al-Nour’s official justified the party’s pro-army stance by 
claiming that Egypt under Morsi ‘was on the brink of a civil war and he was not accepting any 
proposals or compromises that would save the situation’ (Kholaif 2013). In this way, their political 
struggle has been framed as a democratizing effort against both the remnants of the previous 
regime and the Brotherhood’s authoritarianism for the sake of al-Sawad al-A’zam (the vast 
majority). 
 Finally, the democracy master frame has the powerful component of political legitimacy 
that offers Salafis recognition and acceptance for being part of the party system. Hence they can 
gain more legitimacy in the eyes of the general public that has been sceptical or even hostile toward 
them and become more attractive to potential allies. Indeed, this component has allowed the 
formation of broader political alliances with parties and groups that do not share the core values 
of Salafism. As it has already been mentioned, al-Nour has cooperated with socialist parties in the 
Egyptian parliament and the Reform Front has maintained a close relationship with al-Nahda 
(Schwedler 2007; Karakayaa and Yildirim 2013). The use of this component can also deter state 
repression because it raises the political cost of confronting Salafis. However, Salafis are free 
riding on democracy. They do not contribute much to the democratic politics, but they still enjoy 
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the legitimacy that comes with it. It follows that having political legitimacy can become an 
instrument to undermine adversaries who oppose Salafi demands.  
Still the endorsement of the democracy master frame by Salafis in Egypt and Tunisia 
represents a significant development that differentiates them from their counterparts in other 
Muslim-majority countries. The adopted frame has led to the socialization of Salafis into new 
political cultures which include elements of pluralism. Although the master frame has been used 
selectively by Salafis to reach out to pious Muslims, it has also enforced on them new norms of 
conduct and behaviour. In effect, the master frame of democracy has encouraged participation, 
accountability and consensus-building.  
The organization of electoral campaigns, the drafting of the party’s list of candidates in 
accordance to state laws, and frequent interactions with the media have shaped the political 
behaviour of Salafi actors. As a result, Salafis must abide by the constitution and the laws that they 
seek to change. They must take into account not only other political forces, but also the public 
opinion. One may claim that their endorsement of democracy is not genuine, since Salafis support 
political pluralism only if this serves their political goals.  
 
Conclusion 
Salafis have been known for their condemnation of democracy as apostasy. However, 
Salafi parties have been established in Egypt and Tunisia. They have participated in elections and 
served as opposition parties. The post-Arab Spring participatory politics have facilitated the rise 
of electoral Salafism in both countries.  
The master frame of democracy has been applied by Salafis to their local political 
environments to gain support. The component of political equality has not been accepted 
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wholeheartedly by Salafis who usually object to female participation in elections. Yet, they have 
been forced to amend their position. Moreover, they have utilized the component of majority rule 
to justify their political manoeuvring. Finally, the democracy master frame has provided political 
legitimacy to electoral Salafis who have found themselves operating under difficult conditions.  
The future of electoral Salafism would mainly depend on state responses: political 
repression would inevitably bring resistance and confrontation, whereas political accommodation 
could encourage moderation. Salafism is often viewed as extremist and parochial, but it is not a 
monolithic movement. Electoral Salafism can be viewed as a new variation that ought to be 
recognized in its own terms.  
 
Note 
1 Many Salafis believe that the Quran prohibits Muslims from overthrowing - even by democratic 
means - the ruler as long as he allows them to perform their religious duties. Indeed, the Quran 
demands from Muslims to ‘obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority from among 
you’ (4: 59). The believers can only disobey the ruler if he asks them to commit sinful acts. Those 
engaged only in da‘wa and education activities have used this verse to justify their non-
involvement in politics.  
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